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I. ARGUMENT 
A. Mr, Berneau Has Made His Claim Against a Decedent 
Therefore a Personal Representative Is Unnecessary 
Defendant has argued Mr. Berneau's claim must fail because he did not appoint a 
personal representative. Brief of Appellee, p. 7. The fundamental assumption of Defendant's 
argument is that a personal representative must be appointed. However, in making this argument 
Defendant consistently ignores the plain language of the Utah Code which provides claims can 
be made against either a decedent, or against a personal representative. !See Utah Code Ann. § 
71-3-803(b)(2). 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(14) defines an estate as follows: "'Estate' includes the 
property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs are subject to this title as originally 
constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration." The code further states: 
'"Personal representative' includes executor, administrator, successor personal representative, 
special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law 
governing their status." Utah Code Ann. §75-l-201(36)(a). "Decedent" is not within the 
definition of "personal representative" under the Utah Code, and there is clearly therefore a 
distinction between a decedent and a decedent's estate. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-104 addresses how claims are to be made "against the estate," 
which requires the appointment of a personal representative, but does not address claims made 
against a "decedent." Id. Mr. Berneau has clearly established his contention that section §75-3-
1 
803 of the probate code allows a claim to be brought against either an estate, or a decedent when 
the claim is limited to damages covered by liability insurance. Nevertheless, Defendant ignores 
this distinction throughout, as best exemplified in Defendant's Summary of the Argument: 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code provides several limitations on the time 
periods during which a person making a claim against a deceased person must 
present or file their claims. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §75-3-104 requires a 
personal representative to be appointed before commencing or reviving a claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-107, with certain irrelevant exceptions, prohibits 
appointing a personal representative more than three years after the death of the 
decedent. These two sections together create a statutory bar to any claim against a 
decedent if no personal representative is appointed within three years from the 
death of a decedent. 
Brief of Appellee, p. 7 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff Berneau respectfully submits Defendant erroneously claims Utah Code Ann. § 
75-3-104 and -107 govern claims made "against a decedent." Rather, the plain language of these 
statutes limits their applicability strictly to claims made against an estate, and not "any claim," or 
claims against a decedent. As further evidence to the inapplicability of these sections to 
Plaintiffs claims in general, and of the inapplicability of the three year statute of limitations in 
particular, the types of proceedings listed in the three year statute of limitations in section 75-3-
107 are limited to informal probate or appointment proceedings and formal testacy or 
appointment proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107. These proceedings are not at issue 
in Plaintiffs claims. 
Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Code instead provides that claims against a deceased 
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tortfeasor may exist either against a decedent "or" against a personal representative. This plain 
language of the statute cannot be ignored, but is in fact ignored throughout Defendant's 
argument. Defendant's argument therefore must fail. 
B. Utah Law Provides Multiple Ways for Resolving 
Claims Against Deceased Tortfeasors 
In Defendant's brief, Defendant argues allowing a claim to proceed against a decedent as 
set forth under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b) is tantamount to creating "a new cause of 
action." Brief of Appellee, p. 13. This section of Utah's probate code no more creates a "new 
cause of action" than other sections of the probate code which allow for proceeding against a 
personal representative. 
Rather, Utah's probate code simply provides two ways for claims to proceed. First, if a 
plaintiff wishes to seek the assets of a decedent, the plaintiff may proceed against the estate. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(14) (defining "estate" to include the property of the decedent). As 
noted by Defendant, in order to proceed against the estate, a plaintiff must proceed against the 
personal representative of that estate. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104. 
Where a Plaintiff does not wish to "enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent," kL, 
but instead only wishes to make a claim to the amount of liability insurance protection only, 
Section 75-3-803 allows for claims to proceed directly against the decedent, without involving 
the personal representative and estate. This is no more a "new action" than proceeding against a 
personal representative is a "new action," and what Defendant dismisses as "a fiction" of 
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proceeding against a decedent, Brief of Appellee, p. 14, is in fact no different than the ''fiction" 
of proceeding with a claim against a deceased person via a personal representative. 
Both procedures are ways for claims to continue following the death of the tortfeasor. 
Claims against estates allow a Plaintiff to seek a portion of the estate property, and are properly 
subject to shorter time limitations in order to assure the efficient and timely distribution of estate 
assets to the heirs and creditors of that estate. Claims against a decedent up to the limits of 
liability insurance only under section 75-3-803, by contrast, allow for procedures involving 
liability insurance alone, without bothering family members of the deceased, or interfering with 
the distribution of estate assets. These claims are not properly subject to shorter time limitations 
since they do not interfere with the estate, thus the statute itself provides deadlines for claims 
against the estate do not apply. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b). 
Defendant nevertheless repeatedly claims a necessary predicate to the application of 
Section 75-3-803 is the appointment of a personal representative. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 
13-14 ("Section 75-3-803 generally deals with how creditors of an estate must present claims 
when a personal representative has been appointed, and provides time limits when a personal 
representative is appointed.") (emphasis added). Nothing in the plain language of the statute, 
however, supports this argument, and Defendant does not provide statutory support suggesting 
75-3-803 only applies "when a personal representative has been appointed." Rather, the statute 
explicitly provides section 75-3-803 applies in "any proceeding to establish liability of the 
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decedent or the personal representative." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (emphasis added). 
To further Defendant's argument that a personal representative is required, Defendant 
states if this case were to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings "a suggestion of 
death would be appropriate." Brief of Appellee, p. 15. Plaintiff respectfully submits this issue 
was not raised by Defendant at the trial court below, and is therefore not properly raised for the 
first time on appeal. See, e.g.. State v. Weaver. 2005 UT 49, fl9, 122 P.3d 566. Rather, the 
issue properly on appeal is whether a case may be dismissed for failure to appoint a personal 
representative, notwithstanding statutory language under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b) 
allowing an injured person to bring a case after the death of a tortfeasor against either the 
deceased, or a personal representative. 
Plaintiff nevertheless notes Rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not 
mandate a substitution of parties upon the filing of a suggestion of death as implied by 
Defendant. Instead, Rule 25(a) provides: "If a party dies and a claim is not thereby extinguished, 
the Court may order substitution of the proper parties." Utah R. Civ P. 25(a)(1) (emphasis 
added). A court may, therefore, seek the substitution only of a "proper party." In exercising this 
judicial discretion, multiple courts have held under the equivalent Federal rule a substitution is 
only appropriate where the suggestion identifies a representative or successor who could be 
substituted as a party. See, e.g.. Kessler v. Southeast Permanente Med. Group.. 165 F.R.D. 54, 
56 (E.D.N.C. 1995); Young v. Patrice. 832 F.Supp. 721, 724-25 (S.D.N.Y 1993). Here, the 
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proper party is in fact the decedent pursuant to section 75-3-803. Accordingly, as the "proper 
party" is already named a substitution under Rule 25(a)(1), a substitution would be inappropriate 
and inapplicable to the case before the Court. 
Defendant also argues proceeding against a decedent "is simply a de facto direct action 
against the insurer of a tortfeasor." Brief of Appellee, p. 15. This is no more true than in any tort 
action against an insured. State Farm holds a contractual obligation to both defend and 
indemnify the decedent Cameron Martino. This obligation has not changed upon the death of the 
insured tortfeasor.1 The probate statute allows for proceeding against the decedent up to the 
amount of liability insurance. If State Farm were to refuse to defend or indemnify the decedent 
in this case, Plaintiff may proceed by obtaining a default judgment in this matter; if Plaintiff were 
to encounter any difficulty in the collection of any judgment, Plaintiff could then proceed with a 
direct action against State Farm as allowed under section 31A-22-201 of the Utah Code, which 
subjects insurers to direct action by a third party where "execution against the insured is returned 
unsatisfied." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-201; see also Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, fff54-55, 98 
P.3d 28 (discussing the requirements to bring a direct action against an insurer where a defendant 
is deceased). All of these matters pertaining to how Plaintiff may proceed are in fact provided by 
statute and the Rules of Civil Procedure, but regardless are not properly brought before the Court 
]Any issues which may exist pertaining to the contractual provisions of State Farm's 
coverage and its duty to defend and indemnify the decedent may be properly brought before a 
trial court in an action for declaratory judgment under Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and are not properly brought before this Court on appeal. 
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on this appeal. 
C. The Legislature Has Demonstrated a Clear Policy to Extend 
Time Limits Rather than Shortening Time Limits When 
Dealing with Claims Involving Deceased Persons. 
jL Non-controling authority cited by Defendant is not applicable to the issue on 
appeal. 
Defendant cites to In re Estate of Kruzynski, 744 A.2d 1054 (Me. 2000), arguing this case 
stands for the proposition that "claims against a decedent cannot be revived or commenced until 
a personal representative is appointed." Brief of Appellee, p . l 1. However, this was not the issue 
on appeal in Kruzinski; rather, the Maine Supreme Court was faced with an appeal from a county 
probate court, which had dismissed a petition for appointment of a personal representative after 
the statutory deadline to do so. Kruzinski, 744 A.2d at 1055, ^[1. The Court held a M a i n e statute 
which is similar to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 was not applicable to expand the t ime limit to 
appoint a personal representative. I d at 1056, ^[7. The Kruzinski court did not, however , address 
whether a personal representative is required for claims made against a decedent only, and not 
the estate. 
2L Utah law shows a clear policy toward al lowing claims against deceased 
persons and expanding, not shortening, statutes of limitations to allow the 
proper resolution of claims where a party dies. 
Defendant also cites the editorial board comments to some of Utah's statutes in the 
probate code, arguing this "supports a statute of limitations that bars Plaint iffs c la im." Brief of 
Appellee, p . 12. Defendant then states: ' T h e key to these comments is that there are a number of 
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statutory provisions that act as statutes of limitation. They are not mutually exclusive, and any 
may bar the claims of an untimely claimant." IdL This, however, does not address whether the 
sections of the Utah Code requiring the appointment of a personal representative, which by its 
plain language applies only to ua claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors," Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-104, apply in this case, creating a three year time limit. As discussed above 
and in Appellant's Brief, these statutes by their plain language are not applicable to Plaintiffs 
case, as he is not making claims against the estate. 
Reviewing the entirety of applicable statutes pertaining to the death of a tortfeasor instead 
shows a clear policy of expanding statutes of limitations in favor of resolving claims on the 
merits, and not shortening the applicable statute as argued by Defendant. Section 75-3-802 of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code states: "The running of any statute of limitations measured from 
some other event than death and advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspended for 
three months following the decedent's death but resumes thereafter. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 75-
3-802. In addition, chapter two of the Judicial Code (dealing with statutes of limitations) 
provides statutes of limitations are extended to last at least one year following the death of either 
the plaintiff or the defendant, regardless of the norma] expiration of the statute of limitations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-105; see also Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P.2d 
237 (1947) (explaining the operation of then section 104-2-38, now at section 78B-2-105). 
When taken together these statutes show the legislature's intent to: 1) provide clear, 
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explicit language pertaining to the effect of a party's death on the normal statute of limitations for 
claims; and 2) to lengthen, and not shorten, these statutes of limitations. This is consistent with 
the public policy principle favoring resolving claims on the merits, and not on technicalities. 
See, e.g.. Menzies v. Galetka. 150 P.3d 480, 502 (Utah 2006). 
There is nothing in Utah's Probate Code indicating the legislature intended to undermine 
the rights of plaintiffs to recover under tortfeasors' insurance policies. Instead, precisely the 
opposite is indicated by the plain language of the statute: these claims are allowed to proceed 
without effect of the deadlines normally applicable to the efficient administration of decedents' 
estates. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b). This interpretation is also consistent with the 
purpose of the probate code to effect the speedy settlement of estates, so distribution of assets 
will not be delayed or disrupted. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102. 
In the present case, Mr. Berneau timely made his claim within the four years allowed by 
the Legislature for actions based in negligence. Defendant seeks to assert a shortened time limit 
of three years upon Mr. Berneau through a somewhat convoluted and circuitous reading of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code. This reading stands in contrast to the sections of the Utah Code 
cited above, which provide explicit, clear, and unequivocal statements of the effect of the death 
of a party upon statutes of limitations. 
Surely if the legislature intended to shorten the normal statute of limitations for claims 
covered by liability insurance, based upon a triggering event which even State Farm did not 
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know about before the passing of the three year time limit to appoint a personal representative, 
the legislature would clearly and explicitly set forth such an intent when addressing the death of a 
party in the above statutes. Instead section 75-3-802 explicitly states the normal statute of 
limitations "is suspended during the three months following the decedent's death but resumes 
thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the sections which follow." IdL In "the sections that 
follow," section 75-3-803 explicitly exempts claims made against decedents which are covered 
by liability insurance. Id. at -803(4). In short, rather than a clear, explicit statement that the 
normal statute of limitations does not apply, but as argued by Defendant is shorter, the code 
instead provides clear, explicit statements that the normal statute of limitations does apply, and in 
fact may be longer. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-103, a general provision of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, the code states that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of the code1 the 
principles of law and equity supplement its provisions." Mr. Berneau asserts that his claim has 
comported with the necessary statutory requirements and provisions and that any finding which 
would terminate his claim on the grounds that his statute of limitation had been silently shortened 
when neither he nor State Farm had any knowledge of Mr. Martino's passing would be in 
contradiction to principles of equity and public policy evidenced by the legislature in the Utah 
Code. 
10 
D. Both Parties Raised Public Policy Issues at the Trial Court 
and Are Properly Considered by this Court on Appeal 
Perhaps uncomfortable with the manifest inequities of Defendant's argument that 
Plaintiffs claim is barred based upon a shorter statute of limitations, triggered by an event about 
which State Farm itself was not aware until one year after the passing of this alleged deadline, 
Defendant has complained Plaintiff may not raise claims for equitable relief and alleges they 
were not brought before the court below. Brief of Appellee, pp. 18-20. Mr. Berneau respectfully 
disagrees, and submits these issues are properly before the Court on appeal. 
Defendant responded to Plaintiffs Complaint with a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In its supporting Memorandum of this motion, 
Defendant introduced evidence, public policy, and equitable arguments beyond the allegations in 
Plaintiffs Complaint that were not excluded by the trial court in order to bolster Defendant's 
position, such as arguments that this claim inconvenienced the decedent's family, and further 
attached exhibits. R. 32-51. Mr. Berneau in response also presented various public policy 
arguments regarding his claim in his Memorandum in Opposition, R. 52-63, which were not 
objected to by Defendant, and were not excluded from evidence by the trial court. Finally, 
Defendant in his Reply Memorandum again made public policy and equitable arguments; 
presented additional evidence in the form of a letter dated February 1, 2008 from State Farm; and 
admitted in briefing State Farm was unaware of its insured's death until more than four years 
after the collision. R. 64-70. 
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When other evidence is presented to support a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the court does not exclude them, the motion is generally 
treated as a motion for summary judgement. See, e.g., DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 
P.2d 835 (Utah 1996). Defendant's contention that this Court must only consider the applicable 
statutory language and the pleadings is therefore incorrect. All facts and public policy arguments 
Plaintiff raised in his brief were properly made, included citations to the record, and were 
brought before the trail court. Defendant, not having objected to the trial court, may not properly 
object at this time to reference of issues which both parties have addressed to this Court. 
Regardless, however, of the specific facts in this case before the Court, both parties agree 
this issue is one of first impression for the Court. Public policy considerations, such as the effect 
of applying a shorter statute of limitations based upon events which are unknown and perhaps 
unknowable to a litigant, are properly considered when evaluating the plain language of section 
75-3-803, the intended effect of the statute, and the overall purposes and intent of the Probate 
Code. 
Finally, Defendant does make the equitable argument that Plaintiff is culpable of not 
"diligently pursuing" his claims. However, Plaintiff has brought his claim within the four year 
statute of limitations allowed by law, and further refiled suit within the time period provided by 
Utah's "saving statute," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111. Utah's statute of limitations and savings 
statute affords parties the opportunity to discover the totality of damages, and affords 
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opportunities to resolve disputes outside of the litigation process, which can be expensive both 
for the parties and the State. Needless filing of suits prior to Plaintiffs claim being ripe cannot 
be called dilatory; Utah law allows such time to a litigant, and a party cannot equitably be 
deprived of such law by operation of an event unknown even to State Farm within the time 
period it argues should apply. 
IL CONCLUSION 
Defendant's argument hinges upon ignoring the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 75-
3-803, allowing for claims to be brought either against a decedent or against a personal 
representative. Claims can and should be allowed to proceed directly against decedents up to the 
limits of liability insurance without involving the personal representative of an estate to prevent 
disruption of the heirs with matters which have no bearing upon the estate as a matter of law. 
When the legislature has established law effecting the statute of limitations upon the death of a 
party, it has done so clearly and explicitly, and has expanded time limits, not shortened them. 
The only clear and explicit language addressing the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs claims 
states the normal statute of limitations applies in this case or may otherwise be lengthened, Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-802, and that Plaintiffs claim may proceed against the decedent up to the 
limits of liability insurance, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b). As Plaintiff timely filed his 
Complaint, the trail court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and should therefore be 
reversed. 
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DATED this 14 day of July, 2009. 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD 
'yU£r 
Mark T. Flickinger 
Brett R. Boulton 
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